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The author chronicles the history of the security-intelligence system of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He deals with the beginnings of the services'
activities, the laws and regulations passed during the past 55 years, and
the key political processes and events which influenced the development
of the security-intelligence system and society as a whole.  He also dis-
cusses the conditions and background under which the socialist security
system collapsed at the onset of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
explains how the new service emerged.  The author analyzes the affairs
which damaged the reputation of the service, and how the fear and mis-
trust created by the failure to resolve them led to the final legal regulation
governing the activities of the service.  Bosnia and Herzegovina was divid-
ed by the Dayton Agreements into the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.  Two discrete services exist in the
Federation (one the Croatian SNS and the other the Bosniac AID).
Republika Srpska's entity is the Service of State Security. There is no coop-
eration between these three services, although criminality and terrorism
are on the rise.  The author's conclusion is that the law which has been
formulated on intelligence-security services in the Federation must be
immediately adopted, and better cooperation must be established with
Republika Srpska.  As is the case with all similar services, the goal should
be lasting stability and peace in the region.
Introduction
Until its independence and international recognition on 7
February 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of six republics
of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Therefore, its
security and intelligence system is best examined in the context of
the Yugoslav system, a system that emerged at the time when the
first partisan units were formed in the former Kingdom of
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Yugoslavia1. Different forms of intelligence, counterintelligence
and security operations were in place in the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina as early as 1941. They continued without interfer-
ence until May 1942, when the Supreme Command of the
People’s Liberation Partisan Army of Yugoslavia issued the first
“Instruction on Organising the Intelligence and
Counterintelligence Service in the Partisan Units.”2 In November
1942, the Supreme Commander of the People’s Liberation Army
(NOV) and the Partisan Forces of Yugoslavia (POJ) issued the
“Instruction concerning the Structure and Basic Tasks of the
Intelligence Service on the Liberated and Non-Liberated
Territories.” This established a single intelligence organization
covering intelligence and counterintelligence operations and sub-
ordinated the entire organization to the Second (Intelligence)
Division of the Supreme Command3.
At the command of the NOV and POJ Supreme Commander
on 13 May 1944, the Department for the Protection of the Nation
(OZNA) was established at the Commission for the People’s
Defense of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia.
OZNA thus became a centralised security and intelligence organ-
ization with a single structure and uniform working methods
throughout the territory that was later to become Yugoslavia.4
OZNA was organised in four divisions: the first was in charge of
operations abroad and on the occupied territory; the second
operated on the liberated territory; the third had counterintelli-
gence tasks in the NOV and POJ; and the fourth dealt with statis-
tical and technical issues.5
On 15 August 1944, shortly after OZNA had been estab-
lished, the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia estab-
lished the Corps of National Defense of Yugoslavia (KNOJ), a
quasi military police.6 KNOJ was subordinated to the
Commissioner for People’s Defense, who exercised command
through the OZNA chief. In May 1945, at the end of the war,
KNOJ had seven divisions and three autonomous brigades. In
January 1953, its operations were assumed by border units and
People’s Militia.7
Once the Constitution of the Federative People’s Republic of
Yugoslavia (FNRJ) had been passed on 31 January 1946, securi-
ty and intelligence services were reorganised. In March 1946, the
First and the Second OZNA Divisions merged to form the State
Security Service (UDB) at the Ministry of Internal Affairs; the Third
OZNA Division was transformed into the Counterintelligence
Service of the Yugoslav Army (KOS) as the Ministry of People’s
Defense. On September 14, 1955, by the direction of the
Supreme Commander, KOS became a security service of the
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). Military police forces were formed

























Pursuant to the 1953 Constitutional Act, the 1955 Law
Concerning the Regulation of Municipalities and Counties, and
the 1956 Law Concerning the Organs of Internal Affairs, the state
security affairs fell within the exclusive competence of the
Federation. While the 1963 Constitution and the 1965 Law on
Internal Affairs left state security under control of the Federation,
the competence of other bodies (public security and militia) was
transferred to municipal administrative bodies.9
Taking into account the development of the security and intel-
ligence services described, at the beginning of the 60s the
Yugoslav security system was characterised by a centralised state
security organization at the federal level, and a partially decen-
tralised public security organization. The fact that the development
of the security system lagged behind general social developments,
(it even tried to hamper them), led to a critical event that created
radically new relations in the former Yugoslavia. The event – the
Brijuni plenary - proved critical for the further development of the
security system, paving the way for a partial “democratization” of
Yugoslavia.  At the Fourth Session of the Central Committee of the
Yugoslav Communist Party (CK SKJ) held on 1 July 1966, a com-
mission of the Executive Committee of the CK SKJ submitted its
report.10 It stated obliquely that the State Security Service had not
been operating in conformity with the law; it had isolated itself
and become deformed.11 The partial “democratization” of
Yugoslavia, triggered by the Brijuni plenary, took place only with-
in the Communist Party and had a significant impact on further
developments in the SFRY. Therefore, it could be said that the
beginning of Yugoslavia’s democratization was the beginning of
its end.
In order to define accurately the character of these services
and the entire system, one must analyze the ethnic composition of
the leadership, service officials, and the political and ideological
profiles. This paper will now address these issues by concentrating
on the security and intelligence system in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
The Beginning of the Changes and the Emergence of the State
Security Service in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Brijuni plenary (the 4th Session of the CK SKJ) was deci-
sive in that it helped to crush the resistance to state decentraliza-
tion. The 1967 and 1971 constitutional amendments  (the Basic
Law on Internal Affairs of 1 January 1967 and the Constitution of
21 February 1974) mandated that the responsibility for protecting
the constitutional order and state security lay not only with the fed-
eration, but also the republics. They also defined in detail the






























Service (SDB), making it an autonomous professional service at
the Federal Secretariat (Ministry) for Internal Affairs.12
Although their areas of activity, organization, and working
methods had been more precisely defined, the republic-level serv-
ices could not yet be considered autonomous. For one, the state
security theoreticians complained of “the abolition of the state
monopoly over the exercise of powers and affairs of security and
nationalisation, which have been transferred to the framework of
social self-protection, thus imparting a new character to public
security”.13 Also, they cautioned about the federal law, which des-
ignated the organs in the republics and provinces that were
authorised to deal with state security.14
Article 8 of the new law regulating the basic features of the
state security system15 enabled the SFRY Presidency to hire the fed-
eral service at its own initiative for security reasons, or to organise
or perform tasks for state security protection on the territory of the
SFRY .  Not only did the republic-level security organs occupy a
weak position; there also existed a parallel military system of secu-
rity that came within the competence of the Federation; it held a
firm subordinate position and partially overlapped with the civil
security system.16 Another federal intelligence service, established
in 1947 and called the Service for Investigation and
Documentation (SID), was part of the Secretariat of Foreign
Affairs.17 This indicates that republic-level services were practical-
ly impotent, left with few powers to exercise.
Triggered by the 4th CK SKJ session, the political changes
resulted primarily in a partial degree of federalisation; that is,
decentralisation of the Party itself (manifesting itself first in the
changed sequence of party congresses and later in the introduc-
tion of parity for the forming of the SKJ leadership.)18 However,
these changes led to the emergence of prominent political move-
ments, which resulted in the adoption of a new SFRY Constitution
on 21 February 1974.19 Although the adopted Constitution was
“more of a vision than a regulation of the new state of affairs”20,
it established the foundations for the creation of new relations in
the federation. For it was on the basis of this Constitution that new
states emerged from the former SFRY republics, pressured by an
aggressive and hegemonic Serbian nationalism.
The promulgation of the SFRY Constitution21 - on 25 February
197422 - was followed four days later by the Constitution of the
Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SR BIH). The intro-
ductory part of the SR BIH Constitution stated the basic principles: 
“In the course of the revolutionary struggle of the working class
and of all the working people of Yugoslavia - headed by the
Communist Party - in the people’s liberation war and the
socialist revolution, the working class, the working people and


























Croats and members of other nations and ethnicities, togeth-
er with other nations and ethnicities of Yugoslavia - estab-
lished a revolutionary people’s democratic government and
created the People’s Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
within the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.”23 
This statement defines the political and social environment in
which the State Security operated. Such a totalitarian – revolu-
tionary - one-party system would only tolerate a service that
matched its character.24 In “The theses”, one of the manifestos of
the State Security Service of the Socialist Republic of BIH - SDB, it
presents and imposes its views on the future.25
The Ideological Profile, the Mode and Methods of Activity
“The Theses” were devised by the Republic Secretariat of
Internal Affairs (RSUP) in Sarajevo and approved by the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(CK SK BIH). They were to serve as a primer for “professional
politicians” when preparing public lectures; the intent was to cre-
ate informed citizens, ones more active and responsible concern-
ing state security. “The Theses” were given to the municipal com-
munist committees who held lectures, but only for the members of
the Communist Party.
Page 1. “The Theses” discuss the role of the SDB in society,
the conclusions of the CK SKJ Executive Committee concerning
the SDB, and the obligation of citizens (Communists) to be alert
and confront the enemy. Page 2.  The enemy is a potential aggres-
sor whose mission is to destabilise Yugoslavia and “threaten its
sovereignty and integrity”.  To ensure accuracy and credibility, the
second paragraph on page 2 states: 
“Who the possible aggressor might be is not an unknown fact. It
is Italy and Greece, with the support and incitement by Anglo-
Americans and some other NATO members. In their plans of
aggression (both political and military ones), intelligence serv-
ices undoubtedly count on the mobilisation of the hostile part
of the political emigration and on the treacherous role intend-
ed for the extremist remnants of the class enemy in the coun-
try.”26
The State Security Service of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the services of the former Yugoslav republics,
and the Federal Service, were controlled by the Communist Party.
Their role was to serve the Party, safeguard, and consolidate its
power. Only Party members worked for these Services. Interesting
was the SDB BIH practice of processing citizens who were mem-
bers of the Communist Party. Before such activity, “verification”
was required from the CK SK BIH.27 The Party had to give its con-
sent. The year 1986 will illustrate how the State Security Service of
Bosnia and Herzegovina operated.  1986 is distanced from the79
so-called “Dark Ages” and is not too close to the incipient
multi-party system and democracy.28 Thus it can reveal how the
Service operated between 1974 and 1990 and the methods it
used.
In 1986, the State Security Service in Bosnia and
Herzegovina had 589 employees, which was 87.39% of the
674 employees projected. Of these, 61.63% had university
degrees. Apart from the operational staff, the Service had a
reserve force of 646, who would be activated in the Service in
the case of war.  The 1986 report shows that the Service
engaged in the following activities: neutralising foreign intelli-
gence service operations; neutralising enemy emigration oper-
ations; neutralising internal enemy operations; providing secu-
rity and protection to certain persons and facilities; and making
defense preparations. Also mentioned was cooperation with the
federal state security service, the republic-level Ministry of
Internal Affairs, the provincial Ministry of Internal Affairs, law
enforcement bodies, inspection services, and other entities for
people’s defense and social self-protection.29 
During 1986, the State Security Service of Bosnia and
Herzegovina identified “hostile activity” by 2,645 citizens of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, all first offenders.  Therefore, 2,645
new enemies were identified; that is 95 more than in 1985
when “only” 2,550 were accused. However, only 155 were
processed by the Service. Another 140 were dropped from the
list. Thus, in 1986, 1,052 persons were processed: 123 per-
sons for “counterintelligence issues”; 499 for “enemy emigra-
tion”; and 430 as “internal enemies.”30 To achieve these results,
the Service hired 176 new associates and 127 operative con-
nections. At the same time, it dismissed 100 associates and
147 operative connections. The Service ended 1986 with
1,645 information sources, of whom 1,049 were associates
and 596 operative connections. During the year, 94 operative
combinations were carried out, “aimed at making a more direct
operative contact between the Service and the enemy in order
to improve the quality of monitoring the enemy’s activity.” The
Service conducted 13,123 interviews with 9,944 persons, 88 of
whom were foreigners. They searched the premises of 134 cit-
izens, confiscated the passports of 83 citizens, and forced 21
foreigners out of the country.31 For the purposes of other servic-
es and security bodies, they carried out 28,505 full and partial
checkouts. 
The following paragraph will clarify the Service’s working
methods, some of which are still in use:32
“Based on the obtained information concerning the where-
abouts and the relations between extremists in certain

























preventive measures were taken with the aim of initiating new
and deepening the existing conflicts and suspicions, cushion-
ing the subversive and propaganda effects of some emigrant
manifestations and meetings, etc. Thus, measures to discred-
it 154 extremists were planned and taken among emigrants
and foreign police forces, including measures aimed at
alarming and misinforming, which helped to fully or partially
neutralise them. As a part of a counter-propaganda action,
different written materials were delivered to 175 addresses,
which helped to disrupt the unity and rendered impossible the
grouping of some extremist forces of Fascist and
Cominformist emigration”.33
During 1986, the Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina sent
2,440 security interest items to the federal service, to the services
of the other Yugoslav republics and provinces, and to the JNA
security bodies.34 Furthermore, 718 telephones were wiretapped
and 488 flats and other premises bugged. These operations were
part of the measures taken by the SDB BIH in 1986. As a result,
the service filed criminal charges against seven persons and mis-
demeanour charges against two.35
Clearly, even under the legislation of the time, the intensity of
the measures was disproportionate with the results achieved.
Therefore, the State Security Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina
was deemed oppressive and non-democratic. This conclusion was
based on the official information and viewpoints of the service
itself.
In 1976, the State Security Service (SDB) of the BIH Secretariat
of Internal Affairs developed the “Overview of Ustaše Extremists
According to the Countries of Their Residence,” from which it
selected 1,560 persons of interest. The data indicate that the
Mostar sector was the best at “discovering the whereabouts of
Ustaše extremists,” half of whom were illiterate, and only 111
were high school or university graduates.  Mostar conducted
about half of the operative processing (205 out of 453). In its out-
of-country operations during 1976, the SDB used 97 associates
and 178 operative connections.36
The Mostar sector of state security created a nightmare for the
Croats in Herzegovina, who found it difficult to accept Yugoslavia
as their state and impossible to accept the Communist totalitarian
regime. The terror of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, followed by the
war and post-war crimes of the revenge-seeking Communists
affected all Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina and resulted in
mass emigration. The emigration was partly political, but mostly
economic (harsh living conditions and no prospects). 
Every association and activity of Croats abroad was treated as
hostile, extremist and, most frequently, fascist. The experience of






























which got its information from the Yugoslav Embassy, this person
was a member of the Executive Committee of the Society for the
Prevention of Cancer.  Another emigrant organization (Croatian
Revolutionary Brotherhood – (HRB) also worked under the cover
of such a society; therefore, the Service assumed the emigrant was
a member of this “terrorist” organization.37 This is only one of
many instances of the Service terrorising its own citizens and vio-
lating human rights; it is also thought to be responsible for
numerous crimes committed in the country and abroad, starting
with the post-war killings38 and numerous murders committed in
recent times. The SDB of the former Yugoslavia is suspected of the
murder of 86 and disappearance of 5 Croatian emigrants
throughout the world.  These crimes were committed between
1946 and 1990.39
These charges have been only partially proven. The main rea-
sons for this are the lack of documentation and inaccessibility of
crucial witnesses. Another reason is the illegal and non-profes-
sional activity of “the hunters of UDBA agents,” who, for different
motives, complicated and politicized what was a great tragedy of
the Croatian people. Still, Croats and other nations of Yugoslavia
were victims of terror carried out by the former Yugoslav regime
and executed through its intelligence and security apparatus.
The SDB rules of activity regulated the means and methods of
the state security service.  The latest rules, operative also in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, were adopted by the Federal Secretary
(Minister) of Internal Affairs on 27 July 1990.40 These rules were
then adapted to the democratic changes and differed consider-
ably from the ones of 6 January 1989.
The Structure of the State Security Service of the Republic
Secretariat of Internal Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Republic Secretary (Minister) of Internal Affairs of Bosnia
and Herzegovina signed “the Rules on the Internal Structure of the
State Security Service of the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs
of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”; they were in
force on 1 March 1990, having been approved by the Executive
Council of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (the Government) at its special 440th session.41
These were the last rules concerning the structure of the SDB of
BIH; with their adoption, the Service experienced its first free and
democratic election.
The Decision set the number of Service employees at 735.42
The Service was to be “run” by the under-secretary, assisted by a
board comprising a deputy under-secretary, assistants to the
under-secretary, heads of directorates, the head of the SDB sector
in the Center of Security Services (CSB) in Sarajevo, and a secre-

























of SDB sectors in Centers of Security Services. Pursuant to Article
6 of the Rules, the Service had the following organizational units:
departments, sectors, sections, divisions and detachments. The
organizational units in the head office included the following:
1. The Directorate for the Activities and Tasks of Identification and
Prevention of Foreign Intelligence Service Operations - 01;
2. The Directorate for the Activities and Tasks of Identification and
Prevention of Emigration’s Hostile Activity - 02;
3. The Directorate for the Activities and Tasks of Identification and
Prevention of the Internal Enemy’s Activity - 03;
4. The Directorate for Operational and Technical Activities and
Tasks - 04;
5. The Directorate for the Activities and Tasks of Security for
Certain Persons and Facilities - 05;
6. The Directorate for the Activities and Tasks of Defense
Preparations - 06;
7. The Directorate for Analytical and Informative Activities and
Tasks - 07;
8. The Section for the Activities and Tasks of Surveillance;
9. The Section for General, Legal, and Human Resources
Activities and Tasks.
Along with the head office of the Republic Secretariat, the
affairs of state security were discharged by the State Security
Service sectors at the Centers of Security Services seated in Banja
Luka, Bihaæ, Doboj, Gora de, Livno, Mostar, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and
Zenica.
Particular attention should be given to the Center of Security
Services in Mostar and to its state security sector for the significant
and special role they played. The state security sector in Mostar
was in charge of the entire territory of Herzegovina, which includ-
ed the following municipalities: Bileæa, Èapljina, Èitluk, Gacko,
Grude, Jablanica, Konjic, Lištica (today Široki Brijeg), Ljubinje,
Ljubuški, Mostar, Neum, Nevesinje, Posušje, Prozor, Stolac, and
Trebinje. The state security sector at the Center of Security Services
in Mostar consisted of the following units:
1. The Section for the Activities and Tasks of Identification and
Prevention of Foreign Intelligence Service Operations - 01;
2. The Section for the Activities and Tasks of Identification and
Prevention of the Emigration’s Hostile Activity - 02;
3. The Section for the Activities and Tasks of Identification and
Prevention of the Internal Enemy’s Activity - 03;
4. The Section for Operational and Technical Activities and Tasks
- 04;
5. The Division for the Activities and Tasks of Defense Preparations
- 05;
The sector also comprised these Detachments: 































of Èapljina, Grude, Ljubuški, Neum, and Stolac;
2. The SDB Detachment in Konjic, covering the municipalities of
Konjic, Jablanica, and Prozor (Rama);
3. The SDB Detachment in Trebinje, covering the municipalities of
Trebinje, Bileæa, Gacko, and Ljubinje.
According to the plan in the Rules of the Center of Security
Services in Mostar, dated March 1990, 84 people were employed
in the state security sector. As early as April 1990, after the change
of power in the Republic of Croatia, it became clear that similar
changes might also occur in Bosnia and Herzegovina, necessitat-
ing some organizational changes in the Service. It was not, how-
ever, until the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the SDB
reacted. On 1 October 1990, it sent papers and called a meet-
ing of the SDB directorates and sectors.43 The papers contained
the draft of a new structure of the service; it was based on a pre-
vious document, the “The Starting Points for the Transformation of
the State Security Service,” adopted by a board comprising the
Federal Secretary and the Republic and Provincial Secretaries of
Internal Affairs. They started by stating that the Communist Party
was losing power and that the Party service could not survive as it
was. 
The SDB was intent on becoming a professional service that
was not influenced by any political party. According to the “start-
ing points”, such a Service would be governed by the rule of law,
and not “deal with different political options of citizens in the
future.”  It would have expertise, modern technical equipment,
and be headed by an expert on security issues; the organization-
al units would also be headed by experienced professionals.
In addition to the “Starting Points for the Transformation of the
State Security Service,” a new structure was developed. It pro-
posed to reduce the staff by 24.16%. Instead of the 745 employ-
ees previously planned (of which 631 were employed), the new
plan allowed for 565. The draft also gave more autonomy to the
SDB sectors within the Centers, reduced the number of organiza-
tional units, dissolved some of the detachments, and reduced the
management staff by half.44
The Democratic Change and the Early Beginnings of the War in
Bosnia and Herzegovina
These measures were to ensure that the Service survived the
political change.  For it was not just a change of the political party
in power; it was an explosion of the nations who had been
deprived of their rights, each deeply convinced that it had suffered
most under the Communist regime. This unleashed  freedom
gradually changed into quite the opposite; finally, it became anar-

























The elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina (18 November
1990) were won by national parties: the Croatian Democratic
Union, the Party of Democratic Action and the Serbian
Democratic Party (HDZ, SDA and SDS) united in a coalition
against the “reformed Communists.”45 Once the authorities were
established, the SDB leadership changed. The winning parties
agreed on and distributed the leading positions. Nevertheless, the
leading offices were again given to the old SDB staff, who then
introduced the old working methods into the new organization.
The Service was as political as it had ever been, but the political
influence now came from three parties. There was little profes-
sionalism; information and notes were forwarded to party chan-
nels, not to state institutions. The war was about to begin.
After the elections, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was not immediately dissolved, for it took time to
draft the constitutional amendments. On 8 July 1991, the
Government of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
approved the Rules on the Internal Organization of the SDB of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of SR BIH.  They had been developed
on the basis of the “Starting Points for the Transformation of the
State Security Service.” The Rules provided for 529 service
employees, four directorates, and two sections in the head office.
Also, nine sectors were to operate within the framework of Centers
of Security Services as basic organizational units in addition to the
head office. 
The first directorate was called the Directorate for
Counterintelligence and Intelligence Activities and Tasks. The sec-
ond directorate was no longer in charge of enemy emigration; but
its task now was to prevent subversive activities threatening the
constitutional order and security of the country. These were the
two most important novelties in the organization of the Service.
Sectors and Centers of Security Services had seats in the same
towns as previously.
After the Slovenian overture, the war gained momentum in
Croatia. The Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army called for gener-
al mobilisation on a “voluntary basis” and threatened possible
deserters. The federal army was retreating from Slovenia and
crossing over to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Soldiers,
policemen, and civilians were getting killed; so were journalists
who were trying to provide information on developments in the
war-torn areas. In the Declaration of the Council of Ministers of
the European Community (in Brussels on 28 August 1991), the
Serbian policy was judged completely wrong; also, the Yugoslav
National Army was charged with openly supporting the Serbian
side. On 13 September 1991, the American Senate adopted a































In September 1991, two more corps of Serbian and
Montenegrin reservists arrived in Herzegovina.  Not content with
shelling Dubrovnik, they also attacked Croatian villages in
Herzegovina. Between 2 and 5 October, they destroyed Ravno
and Prhinje (seven Croatian villages were also destroyed in south-
ern Herzegovina). At the BIH Government meeting on 9 October,
the consensus was that Bosnia and Herzegovina remain neutral in
the war waging on the Yugoslav territories.47 The indifference of
the BIH authorities was due to passivity and disorientation. Also,
Muslim political leaders favored an independent Bosnia and
Herzegovina, but were calculating on and hoping for a military
coup that would preserve Yugoslavia.48 In response, Croats
organised into national defense unions. First, (12 November
1991), the “Croatian Union of Bosanska Posavina”49was estab-
lished in Bosanski Brod, followed (on 18 November) by the
“Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna.”50 
From the beginning, Serbs supported the aggression. On 3
September 1991, one month before the attack against Ravno, the
Municipal Committee of the Serbian Democratic Party in Mostar
(with the Communist Party Movement for Yugoslavia and the SDP),
held a “Rally of Support for the JNA and the Federative
Yugoslavia.”51 It was one of series of similar rallies with the same
message and organised by the same organizations of pro-
Yugoslav or pro-Greater Serbia orientation. 
The most perfidious case of attempting to overthrow the dem-
ocratically elected authorities involved a “club of intellectuals”
specifically formed for this purpose. The “club” members called
themselves “citizens of Mostar”; they held a protest rally (10
March 1992), and demanded the resignation of all municipal and
regional authorities, including “police officials.”52 The resignations
would have neutralized the legitimate defense of Mostar and
Herzegovina.  The Service could not possibly have remained unit-
ed. And, as the war escalated, it broke down completely.
Serbs, along with the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), pro-
claimed the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in Sarajevo on 9 January 1992. The BIH Parliament,
the MPs of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and the Party
of Democratic Action (SDA), together with the MPs of other par-
ties, organized a referendum for an independent Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which was successfully held on 29 February and 1
March 1992.53
The European Community and the Republic of Croatia rec-
ognized Bosnia and Herzegovina on 7 April 1992. The same day,
the Patriotic League of the BIH and the Regional Headquarters
started two-day “military” consultations in Mehuriæ near Travnik,
adopting a “Directive for the Defense of the Sovereignty of the

























enemy’s forces as 6 Yugoslav Army corps and about 120,000
SDS members. At the time, they included among the enemy the
“extremist forces of the HDZ,” with 1-2 brigades.55 The Muslim
Patriotic League, established 2 May 1991, hoped to safeguard
and secure the interests of the Muslim people. Subsequently, on
10 June 1991, under the auspices of the SDA, the Muslims estab-
lished the Council of National Defense at the Militia House in
Sarajevo, with the Patriotic League as its military wing. All SDB
Muslim officials participated in the Council.
The JNA counterintelligence service launched an action of
controlled terror. The Serbs shelled Bosnia and Herzegovina, par-
ticularly Mostar. The only force organised and capable of resist-
ance was the Croatian and Muslim members of the police. In one
of the last negotiations between the police and the army, the head
of the Center of Security Services in Mostar revealed Serbia’s plan
of aggression in Herzegovina. He gave the dates and venues of
the meetings between Serbian generals and politicians and when
they decided to occupy Neretva, to reject the independence of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to launch their attack.56
Still, the politicians and journalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina
refused to accept reality;  they often misled the public with reports
that it was “those from the hills” who were shooting, or “peasants
had attacked the people,” or that some “rural forces attacked the
urban ones” and the like.57 This information was collected by the
officials of the State Security Sector in Mostar from a “journalist”
who was assigned by the SDS as the propaganda co-ordinator
between the SDS and the federal army, the latter actually being
the Serbian army. After the blockade, the Serbian forces started
the war for Sarajevo. At the same time, conflicts in Kupres and
Mostar broke out. 
On 8 April 1992, the Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna estab-
lished the supreme defense body of Bosnian Croats, the “Croatian
Defense Council” (HVO).58 In 1992 and the first half of 1993,
many Muslims joined these military units, becoming a majority in
some. 
The situation in Sarajevo was complete chaos. A crisis center,
established in Mostar, met on 29 April 1992 and declared the
JNA and all its paramilitary forces the enemy and the occupying
forces. The protection and defense of Mostar was given to the
Croatian Defense Council and the Mostar members of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The decision was signed by Croat and
Muslim members of the crisis center.59
The Security Service employees and Bosnian Serbs who were
members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs joined the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of the Republic of the Serbian People in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (later to become Republika Srpska). The State






























Thus, the structure and the working methods of security and intel-
ligence services in Republika Srpska, both civilian and military, did
not significantly change. 
On 3 April 1992, the head of the Security Service Center in
Mostar was informed by the former head of the public security
office in Nevesinje that the Minister of Internal Affairs of Republika
Srpska had appointed him head of the State Security Center in
Trebinje. He offered co-operation, but also a division of proper-
ty.60
Fed up with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s passivity to open
aggression, Croatian and Muslim officials of the Service moved to
Mostar, where they joined the Mostar center and became mem-
bers of the Croatian Defense Council. Also, Muslim agents esti-
mated that security was better and the threat of war smaller in
Sarajevo. In those days, the opinion of the President of the BIH
Presidency was,  “This is not our war”; his message to the citizens
on the Sarajevo TV was, “Take a walk, ignore the rumors, social-
ize.”61 So they walked to Sarajevo, where they experienced war at
its worst.62
The Service joined in the defense, but it is difficult to define
what the Service was in the first months of the war. The Croatian
and Muslim officials worked together until 21 October 1992,
when the Mostar center was again changed. Many Muslim offi-
cials of the Center joined the command of the IV Corps of the BIH
Army. Others remained members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
of the Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna.
The Formal Dissolution of the Service
After establishing the Croatian Defense Council, the
Presidency of the Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna (HZ H-B) cre-
ated a number of provisional organs of authority.  On 15 May
1992, the Presidency appointed the Head of the Defense
Department and the Head of the Internal Affairs Department.63
Their first task was to draft provisions for regulating their depart-
ments (later to become Ministries). As early as 3 July 1992, the
Decree on Armed Forces of the HZ H-B was adopted64; on 24 July
1992, the President of the HZ H-B Presidency appointed the
“Assistant to the Head of the Defense Department as the official
in charge of the HZ H-B Security and Information Service”; his
task was to set up a Security and Information Service within the
HVO Defense Department.65 Having received the draft proposal
of the structure of the Security and Information Service (SIS), the
HZ H-B government (on 14 October 1992) appointed the
Assistant to the Head of the Defense Department as the HZ H-B
official in charge of security.66
As the conflict between Croats and Muslims escalated and the

























HZ H-B Presidency and the Croat MPs in the Council of
Municipalities of the BIH Parliament passed the Decision on the
Establishment of the House of Representatives of the Croatian
Republic of Herceg-Bosna. The House of Representatives also
passed the “Fundamental Decision” establishing and proclaiming
the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna.67
1993 was marked by violent fighting between Croats and
Muslims who, exhausted by fierce battles and exposed to strong
political pressure, signed a cease-fire agreement on 23 February
1994. Generals Ante Roso and Rasim Deliæ signed.68 At the time,
the military and civil intelligence and security systems were com-
pletely divided according to ethnicity. 
In the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, security services
were integrated into the ministries of defense and internal affairs.
Defense had a Security Sector headed by the Assistant to the
Minister of Defense in charge of security. The sector consisted of
the Department of the Security and Information Service (SIS) and
the Military Police Department, and existed only formally. In reali-
ty, the two departments were autonomous. The head of the
Military Police Department was also a member of the board of the
Minister of Defense and submitted his reports to the Minister and
to the President of the HZ H-B Presidency. The reason was that the
Military Police Department was formed on 10 April 1992 and
managed to gather a number of human, material, and technical
resources, becoming a force of several thousand. The SIS
Department was established three months later and only started to
operate in October 1992. The Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna
was a newly established organization, and the balance of power
mattered more than its formal structure (the Decision on the
Internal Structure of the Defense Department, passed on 17
October 199269).  that is, on 20 May 199370.
The Security and Information Service was active in the
Defense Department. According to the structure introduced in
October 1992, the two SIS departments (the Operational
Department and the Analytical Department) were situated in the
head office. The Service had its centers in different operational
zones that later became HVO military districts: southeastern
Herzegovina, south-western Herzegovina, central Bosnia, and
Bosanska Posavina. The seats of the centers were in Mostar,
Tomislavgrad, Travnik, and Derventa. Agents in the operational
zones and military units had been appointed by their command-
er; however, the Service had no staff in the HVO headquarters. In
December 1993, a new structure71 developed and adopted rules
governing the activity of the Security and Information Service.72
The SIS Administration was now run by the Head of Administration
and his assistant, who also headed the Operational Department.






























Technical Departments. In addition to the head office, SIS had its
centers in Mostar, Tomislavgrad, Orašje, and Vitez. The Mostar
center had a branch in Èapljina, the Tomislavgrad center in
Rama.
A SIS center was also opened in Kiseljak. Under the new struc-
ture, security departments in military districts were run by assistants
to commanders up to the rank of a brigade or by an autonomous
battalion; the Supreme Command had a security service officer.
The Service was thus supposed to have its officers in the depart-
ments and offices of defense. This structure gave the Security
Sector a prominent role in the armed forces of the Croatian
Republic of Herceg-Bosna. The service started to function in
spring 1994, in the context of new political developments in BIH
following the end of the war between Croats and Muslims and the
signing of the Washington Agreement on 18 March 1994.73
Beside the SIS, another military service existed in the Croatian
Republic of Herceg-Bosna, the first security and intelligence body
established on the Croatian side. It was established 1 February
1990 within the framework of the Territorial Defense of Western
Herzegovina (the Supreme Command of the HVO H-B).74 The
Department consisted of intelligence groups that had sponta-
neously formed without an organizational basis in the municipal
commands of the then territorial defense. It included reconnais-
sance and electronic activity units, which had emerged through
spontaneous shadowing and wire-tapping of the enemy forces in
summer 1991. 
The first such unit was established within the Intelligence
Department of the Herceg-Bosna Supreme Command on 8
March 1992. At the beginning of 1994, the HVO was restruc-
tured. The military intelligence service was transformed from an
intelligence department into an intelligence directorate. The elec-
tronic activity units were transformed into the 88th electronic activ-
ity center, as an HVO unit under the head of the Intelligence
Directorate of the Herceg-Bosna Supreme Command. Apart from
the head office, the Intelligence Directorate had its intelligence
agents in different Military Districts.
Moreover, the Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna had a civil
intelligence and security service, a remnant of the Mostar State
Security Service of the BIH Ministry of Internal Affairs. On 14
August 1992, the Presidency of the Croatian Union of Herceg-
Bosna passed a Decree on Internal Affairs in Case of War or an
Immediate Threat of War in the Territory of Herceg-Bosna, mak-
ing applicable the provisions of the Law on Internal Affairs of the
BIH Republic. According to Article 13, a separate law regulated
the scope of activity and organization of state security. At the pro-
posal of the Head of the Internal Affairs Department, the provi-

























January 1993) to appoint the “State Security Officer in the Internal
Affairs Department of the Croatian Defense Council, Croatian
Union of Herceg-Bosna.”75
Pursuant to a decision taken by the HVO of Herceg-Bosna
(26 February 1993), the National Security Office (UNS) was
established within the Internal Affairs Department.76 The Office
was to have competence over intelligence and counterintelli-
gence. During the war, the UNS was inferior to the military servic-
es. In fact, the first serious attempt to put this service into opera-
tion was the adoption of the Law on Internal Affairs of the
Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna on 26 March 1994.77 This Law
established the “National Security Service” (SNS) within the
Ministry of Internal Affairs (Articles 14 to 25). On 25 July 1994,
the Minister of Internal Affairs passed the Rules on the Internal
Structure of the National Security Service within the Herceg-Bosna
Ministry of Internal Affairs.78
But the Rules proved unmanageable; on 7 November 1995,
new rules were adopted governing the structure and job specifi-
cation of the National Security Service of the Herceg-Bosna
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The SNS was now headed by a man-
aging officer with an office in Mostar. Four departments were
established: the Operative Department, the Analysis, Information
and Documentation Department, Operational Technology
Department, and Security Department. Apart from the head office,
centers were established: in Mostar, Livno, Travnik, and Derventa.
The Presidential Council of the Croatian Union of Herceg-
Bosna was established after the President of Herceg-Bosna
resigned on 8 February 1994.79 It set up a National Security
Office affiliated to the Presidential Council. On 8 June 1995, the
Council appointed a provisional head of the office with the task
of establishing the Office and preparing the necessary acts.80 The
acts, however, had never been adopted by the ruling bodies. The
appointed Head of the National Security Office thus had an advi-
sory role and was in charge of cooperation with foreign services.
A meeting held in Split (22 July 1995) between the Director of the
Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS), the Head of the State Security
Service of the BIH Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Head of the
National Security Office of Herceg-Bosna was the first for these
services and their  first attempt to cooperate in the fight against
the Serbian enemy.81
On the same date, the President of the Republic of Croatia,
the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and the President of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina signed the “Split Declaration”.82 Among other things,
the Declaration provided for extended and enhanced military
cooperation between the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia and































to the Republic of Croatia for urgent military and other assistance,
to which the Republic of Croatia affirmatively responded. The
Croatian Army entered the territory of BIH, where, with the assis-
tance of the HVO and the BIH Army, defeated the Serbian forces,
completely crushed the Serbian rebellion, and liberated the occu-
pied areas of the Republic of Croatia. 
These actions changed the balance of power in the region,
which led to the signing of interconnected international legal acts
known as the Dayton Agreement (November and December 1995
83). Throughout this period, the intelligence services of the
Republics of Croatia and Herceg-Bosna cooperated in preparing
and protecting these operations that ensured the safety of the mil-
itary units. Howver, the cooperation with the State Security Service
of the BIH Ministry of Internal Affairs was unsatisfactory.
Shortly after the war operations and the signing of the peace
agreement (20 December 1995), a meeting was held in Sarajevo
between the Assistant to the Minister of Internal Affairs in charge
of the BIH State Security Service and the Head of the National
Security Office of the Presidential Council of Herceg-Bosna.84
Discussed was the possibility of creating a joint service; even a
possible name was mentioned: The Information Service of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BHIS). At the same time, Croatia’s HIS invited
the State Security Service to a summit meeting in Sarajevo. It
appeared that cooperation had at last been established, for on 12
January 1996, just before its dissolution, the Presidency of the
Dayton Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina established the
Agency for Investigation and Documentation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (AID).85 The Agency took over the affairs, property,
and staff of the State Security Service and the central national
bureau of BIH INTERPOL.86 At the session held on 27 and 28 May
1996, the Parliament of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
passed the Law on the Agency for Investigation and
Documentation.87
The AID had a Director and was organised with 8 sections in
the head office, all run by assistants. Along with the head office,
the AID had 8 sectors: in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihaæ, Zenica, Doboj,
Gora de, Mostar, and Banja Luka. Each sector had numerous
detachments (in Travnik, Bugojno, Gradaèac, Zvornik, Brèko,
Bjeljina, Fojnica, Tarèin, Visoko…). The Doboj sector was seated
in Tešanj, and the Banja Luka sector in Sanski Most.
In addition to the civil security service, the Bosniak side88 had
two military services. The Military Security Service’s activities had
been regulated by the “Rules of Activity of the Military Security
Service in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina”.89 It overlooked the affairs of state security in the
armed forces of BIH and was directed by the Head of the Security



























ments: the Human Resources and Legal Affairs Department, the
Technology Department, the Counterintelligence Department, the
Department for the Supreme Command Security and Military
Police, the Department for the Counterintelligence Protection of
the Supreme Command and Command-related Units, the
Department for Special Counterintelligence Operations, the
Analytical Department, the Division for the Counterintelligence
Protection of Military Attachés, and the Division for the
Investigation and Documentation of War Crimes. Outside its head
office, the service operated through military headquarters.
Apart from the security service described above, Muslims-
Bosniaks also established an intelligence service. At first, an intel-
ligence department was set up within the Supreme Command of
the BIH Army. It was eventually called the Intelligence Directorate
of the Supreme Command of the BIH Army. The Directorate was
run by a head and a deputy. It had seven departments: the
Analytical Department, the Intelligence Operations Department,
the Electronic Activity Department, the Department for Relations
with Foreign Armies, Human Resources and Information
Technology Department, the Department for Special Operations
and Training, and the Department for the Intelligence Security of
Combat. Outside its head office, the service operated through
Intelligence Centers in the headquarters of the BIH Army corps
and through intelligence branch centers and posts. 
The Intelligence Directorate of the Supreme Command of the
BIH Army was active in the military field, but it also worked to infil-
trate the civil and political spheres. Two actions illustrate its mode
of operation: the “Kamp 22”90 Operation and an action described
in a document entitled, “The Federal Policy and the Croatian
Subjects Responsible for Subversive Activities in southwestern
Herzegovina”.91 Their object was to discredit the Croatian policy
in BIH by using false “documents” by the SFOR and OSCE. The
Croatian services exposed these actions and established a con-
nection between the Mostar intelligence center and the Third
Section of the Intelligence Directorate of the BIH Army Supreme
Command. The media published the Directorate’s original docu-
ments.92 After the operation was exposed, the head of the Mostar
operational center and the head of the OSCE regional center in
Mostar were removed.
The President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
reacted to the establishment of the AID in an open letter to the
highest officials of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of
the Federation. He stated that the establishment was a flagrant
violation of the Constitution of the BIH Federation and it obstruct-
ed the rule of law.93 The letter also pointed out that the decision
derogated the powers of the federal Ministry of Internal Affairs and































On 15 February 1996, IFOR units discovered that the ski
resort at Pogorelica had been turned into a training camp for AID
operatives.94 The trainers were intelligence operatives from Iran,
MOIS members, three of whom were arrested. Also arrested were
eight Bosniak-Muslim AID agents. Pressured by the international
community (the U.S. in particular), the Presidency of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina removed the AID Director from office
on 16 March 199695, one month after the IFOR action and one
day after the Director had told the “Washington Post” that he
would not resign.96 In a pro-SDA (the ruling party) weekly maga-
zine, the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina
said  that “The thing in Pogorelica near Fojnica was our big mis-
take.”97
In June 1996, two AID operatives98 and two members of spe-
cial police forces (the Bosna unit) of the BIH Ministry of Internal
Affairs kidnapped, interrogated, tortured, and shot a colleague of
theirs, also an AID operative. They finally dropped him in a sewer,
but he survived.99 Today he is allegedly a protected witness of the
Hague Tribunal investigating crimes purportedly committed by the
special police unit, “Ševe”100. The former Chief of Staff of the BIH
Army filed criminal charges with the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Hague against this “pro-
tected witness” and a number of high police and military officers,
citing serious criminal offences, including an assassination
attempt against his person, during which his wife and her brother
were killed.101
The first to visit the wounded AID operative was Ned ad
Ugljen, the former chief of the former SDB. Their long conversa-
tion was recorded. Shortly thereafter, Ugljen was assassinated in
the center of Sarajevo.102 His assassins have never been discov-
ered, despite his having talked to the President of the BIH
Presidency shortly before he was killed, telling him that he was
going to be killed and by whom.103
Ear1y in 1997, the AID was again shaken by scandal: On 6
February 1997, the head of an AID detachment in Central Bosnia
disappeared with his wife and three daughters.104 He surfaced
later and explained his actions in one of the Croatian weeklies.105
He fled in fear for his life.  The AID, he said, was a purely Muslim
organization in the service of the political party of the SDA.  Also
he had personally executed the orders of his superiors, including
fabricating “evidence” and bringing false witnesses against certain
Croatian officers, so as to have them charged with war crimes.106
On the Croatian side, the services operated silently, and little
information had been released to the public. The pre-Dayton
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Republic of
Herceg-Bosna ceased to exist, and their powers were transferred



























Croat member of the BIH Presidency appointed an internal policy
adviser to the Office of the Presidency representing the Croatian
people.107 His role, similar to that of the former head of the
National Security Office in the Presidential Council of the
Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, consisted of coordinating
Croatian services in BIH and cooperating with foreign services.
When several Croats were arrested in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and in Croatia for criminal offences, the media launched a cam-
paign against the leaders of Croatian services in BIH and Croatia.
In addition, criminal charges were filed against them.108 These
charges were eventually dismissed, but not until they had been
exploited by the media. 
The crisis involving Croatian services in BIH climaxed on 24
December 1998, when the police of the Hercegovaèko-
Neretvanska county and the National Security Service officials
took over the office of the Adviser to the member of the BIH
Presidency representing the Croatian people. The Adviser, at his
own request, had been relieved of his duties on 24 September
1998; for the results of the general elections held in BIH on 12
and 13 September had led to a change in the seat of the BIH
Presidency member representing the Croatian people.
After the elections, the resources of the National Security
Service were severely reduced; also, it was uncompetently run by
people who did not understand the context in which it operated.
They did not maintain the high rating of the Service, which had
been acquired through professional cooperation with all the serv-
ices present in BIH, by providing support to the peacemaking
process, and by enhancing the safety of peace-keeping forces.
Among other acts, incompetent officials launched attacks against
some international organizations active in BIH. These develop-
ments encouraged a part of the international community which
wanted to crush the ruling HDZ in the Republic of Croatia. Add to
this the offended vanity of the then SFOR commander, which
prompted the invasion by the SFOR forces on 14 October 1999109
of SNS and other Croatian offices and institutions in the western
part of Mostar.  This action made the National Security Service
equal with the Agency for Investigation and Documentation, forc-
ing a change in the Service leadership. The staff now running the
National Security Service, as well as AID, must reassert and
assume its place in the international security system.  One way to
do this is to adopt the Law on the Intelligence and Security Service
of the BIH Federation.
The Reintegration of the Security and Intelligence System in the
Post-Dayton Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The military intelligence and security service (VOSS) of the































Constitution, by Annex 4 of the General Framework Agreement
for Peace in BIH of 1995, the Constitution of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina,110 the Law on the Defense of the BIH
Federation of 1996,111 and by the Provisional Rules of the Activity
of the Military Intelligence and Security Service of the BiH
Federation of 1998. The VOSS of the BIH Federation is a spe-
cialised military, professional element in the Federation’s defense
system in charge of intelligence and security activities in the
defense sphere.  The service is sited within the Federal Ministry of
Defense’s Intelligence and Security Sector and run by the assistant
to the minister and a deputy. The Sector has five sections.  Along
with the head office, there is the territorial structure of intelligence
and security units. 
An Intelligence and Security Directorate was established in the
Joint Command of the Federation Army.  It is run by the assistant
to the Chief of Staff of the Joint Command and a deputy. The
Directorate consists of four sections and three divisions.  Other
sections and divisions exist in the corps, brigades, and other units.
The legality of the service’s activities is monitored by the
Parliamentary Commission of the BIH Federation for Defense,
Security and the Control of Legality of Activities Performed by
Services Safeguarding the Federation’s Constitutional Order.112
Civil services in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
continued to operate separately. After the establishment of the AID
and the assassination of the former SDB director, discussions con-
cerning cooperation and unification of the services were suspend-
ed. Disputes ensued, with Security services a major issue.
However, two weeks after the President of the Republic of Croatia
and the President of the BIH Presidency met and reached an
agreement  (6 August 1997), a Croat member of the BIH
Presidency selected two other BIH Croat members and formed a
joint working group. This group of Bosniak and Croat experts,
with the assistance of U.S. experts, was to draft a new structure for
the security and intelligence system of the BIH.113 The Bosniak side
balked, violating the agreement. Nevertheless, two Presidency
members (a Croat and a Bosniak) formed a working group of four
members. Their task was to present a plan for the organization
and leadership of the federal service, which in turn was to assume
the duties and powers of the AID.114 Following several discussions
and working meetings and agreements, the group composed and
submitted (3 February 1998) “Proposal of the Organization and
Administration of the Federal Service for Security and Intelligence
Activities.” The proposal contained the basic principles for draft-
ing the Bill. As agreed, two U.S. experts assisted the group.115
Subsequently, this working group drafted the Bill Establishing
the Security and Intelligence Service. The group was efficient,



























members of the working group on 4 March 1998.  It was then
submitted to the members of the BIH Presidency representing the
Croatian and Bosniak people, who signed it on 6 March,116 two
days after receiving it. Thus, the bill went from the field of expert-
ise to the field of politics. However, politicians then were not will-
ing to accept a strong, professional service. When the Bill was
being drafted, some politicians argued against it.117 And the
media’s slanted articles created confusion and distrust.118 Some of
these statements were even denied even by the President of the
BIH Presidency.119
On 12 June 1998, the AID Director sent the preliminary draft
of the Bill Establishing the Intelligence and Security Service to the
Federal Ministry of Justice for its approval, pursuant to Article 21
of the Rules of Procedure of the Government of the BIH
Federation.120 The Ministry responded negatively (30 June
1998.121).  A number of provisions were incompatible with the BIH
Constitution; also, the powers of the service had not been accu-
rately determined; it was unclear whether it was a federal institu-
tion or at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Office for
Legislation of the Government of the BIH Federation concurred
with the Ministry of Justice.122  These events occurred before the
general elections in BIH; excluding the positive remarks, the
remaining criticism was mere political posturing.  
A change occurred in the working group on the Croatian side.
First, the Adviser to the member of the Presidency resigned after
the elections; then the second member of the group, the Deputy
Minister of Internal Affairs of the BIH Federation, was assassinat-
ed by a planted explosive device (16 March 1999). The bomb
exploded as his official vehicle was passing through Alipašina
Street, near the U.S. Embassy in the center of Sarajevo.123 The
explosive device badly wounded the Deputy Minister; he died sev-
eral days later. 
The assassination was followed by a flurry of accusations. The
Croatian member of the Presidency blamed the Bosniak supreme
authorities and the SDA authorities.124 The President of the BIH
Presidency termed the accusations ridiculous and lay the blame
for terrorism on “our fools” (Muslim-Bosniak, ann. by the author)
or on Croatian extremists. Since the assassins of John Kennedy,
Olaf Palme, and Aldo Moro remain unknown, he implied that this
murder would also remain unsolved.  The person(s) responsible
for the murder of the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is still loose in the envi-
ronment. 
The editor-in-chief of a Sarajevo weekly stated (3 July 1999)
that the federal Ministry of Internal Affairs was convinced that
investigation is fruitless unless it involves key members of the































MOS were untouchable, for they had recruited the Bosniak-
Muslim human resources for the federal Ministry of Internal
Affairs.125 The killers of the Assistant to the AID Director (murdered
on 28 September 1996) are still unknown. So are those responsi-
ble for the disappearance of an HVO general on the night of 8
and 9 March 1995; he had argued with the commander of the V
Corps of the BIH Army in Bihaæ, where the HVO was a minority,
and fought with the BIH Army against Serbian aggressors.126
Few perpetrators have been identified in the 172 terrorist-like
criminal offenses recorded since the end of the war and present-
ed to the Parliament of the BiH Federation by the Commission for
Defense and Security in December 1997.127 These included the
acts of terrorism that had disturbed the public in Bosnia and
Herzegovina; i.e., the car bomb planted near a residential block
in Splitska Street in Mostar on 18 September 1997. At first, the
reports mentioned only 50 persons wounded.128 Subsequently, the
numbers rose to 93 flats, 13 business premises, and 96 cars.129 In
this case, some 40 Arabs, former Mujahedins, were arrested, but
only five remained in prison. The defendants repeatedly changed
their statements , which confused the issues and evidence and left
the case compromised.130 Still unidentified are those who attacked
a politician in Mostar with an explosive device and then two days
later wounded him in a shower of automatic gun fire.131 Also at
large are those who destroyed churches and mosques throughout
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
These unsolved cases argue for a strong professional service
like that envisaged in the Bill Establishing the Intelligence and
Security Service of the BIH Federation. Based on the conclusion of
the Government of the BIH Federation (the 37th meeting held on
15 March 2000), the Federal Ministry of Justice was obligated to
harmonise the Bill with the Constitution and the legislative system
of the BIH Federation. The Ministry of Justice’s new Bill was sent
to the AID and SNS representatives on 28 March 2000.  They
responded that they favored the version of the Bill that had already
been discussed by both Houses of the BIH Parliament and to
which no objections had been raised. On 31 March 2000, the
Federal Ministry of Justice forwarded to the Government of the
BIH Federation the new Bill harmonised with the FBIH
Constitution.132 The AID Director’s letter to the Prime Minister of
the BIH Federation and his Deputy133 stressed that the SNS and the
AID supported the Bill that had been discussed at the 37th meet-
ing of the FBIH Government, for this version had been fully har-
monised. He also asked that the Bill be included in the agenda of
the next Government meeting and then forwarded for discus-
sion.134
This Bill was to serve as the basis for the establishment of the



























BIH (OSS FBiH).135 It is planned as an autonomous federal serv-
ice, seated in Sarajevo. Its intelligence activities would safeguard
the constitutional order of the BIH Federation and conduct coun-
terintelligence operations. The service would have no police
authorities, and would be run by a director and a deputy, each
representing one of the two constituent nations. The service would
have the required number of organizational units outside its head
office. On the date of the Law’s enforcement, the AID and SNS,
both now performing  security and intelligence activities for the
BIH Federation, would cease to exist.136
This Bill differs little from the version drafted two years ago,
and then only as it relates to who uses the information developed,
the members of the Presidency or the FBIH President and Vice
President? In other words, who will control the service? However
it turns out, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina needs a
strong professional service.  It requires an efficient security and
intelligence system, staffed by young, educated people, relatively
free of prejudice, and last, a system controlled by democratic prin-
ciples and authorities, one which will ably join European and
world security systems.    
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